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Abstract 
 
Optimism and overconfidence are well documented cognitive biases in the entrepreneurship 
literature (see Shepherd et al., 2015). Although these sentiments are  typically thought to be 
almost overlapped, empirical studies make evidence of their different construct (see Trevelyan, 
2008, 2011). In the paper at hand we investigate the descriptive and normative motivations 
inducing misconfidence biases to arise. First, we introduce the definition of optimism as under-
estimation of the task difficulty to meet a strategic Key Performance Indicator (KPI). Second, we 
define overconfidence as the tendency to overestimate the probability to achieve an uncertain 
task. To calculate this  probability we set up a prescriptive benchmarking-based model. Third, we 
spotlight situations in enterprise risk management (ERM) where misconfidence biases in 
judgment emerge. Complementing Bordley et al. (2015) and Tibiletti and Uberti (2015) results, we 
show that overconfidence arises in presence of two extreme circumstances: (1) underestimation 
of task difficulty coupled with extremely poor entrepreneurial projects, and (2) overestimation of 
task difficulty coupled with extremely good entrepreneurial projects. Our theoretical findings  
match with accounted biased behaviors recognized among entrepreneurs known as  the 
escalation and de-escalation of commitment effect biases. The study is based on the normative 
foundation for overconfidence set up by Bordley et al. (2015) and casts light on which 
circumstances that occurs. Our results have  also practical implications. In fact, it is important for 
entrepreneurs be aware of situations where self-confidence is normatively biased. 
 
Keywords: Optimism and Overconfidence, Benchmarking Procedure, Escalation and De-
escalation of Commitment, Regulatory Focus Theory, Strategic Key Performance Indicators. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION1 
Research in entrepreneurship recognizes that entrepreneurs are individuals generally prone to 
fail in optimism and overconfidence biases (see [1] for an ample review on entrepreneurial 
heuristics and biases, and specifically [2]; [3]; [4]; [5]). The optimism bias refers to entrepreneurs’ 
tendency  to underestimate the difficulty of the goal  to meet; whereas overconfidence bias refers 
to  the tendency to overestimate the probability of success of the entrepreneurial project at hand. 
These cognitive biases are typically thought to be positively interdependent and even overlapped. 
However supported by empirical studies based on online surveys [6] claims that optimism and 
                                                 
1
   A previous version of this paper titled “Optimism and Overconfidence Biases among Entrepreneurs: a benchmarking-
model” has been presented at the  4th European Business Research Conference 9-10 April 2015, Imperial College, 
London, UK. The Authors are in debt with the participants for their valuable comments. 
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overconfidence are distinct constructs with no relevant positive association. Extending and 
complementing this line of inquiry, we delve deeper their differences and explore why 
entrepreneur rationally engage biased judgements. 
 
First, we give a formal definition of optimism according to the perceived difficulty to achieve the 
goal. The more the goal is easy-perceived, the higher the agent optimism level; and vice versa for 
hard-perceived goals. Based on the results of [7] we illustrate the link between the easy/hard goal 
perception and the agent gain-seeking/loss-aversion attitude.  
 
Second, we suggest a probabilistic definition of self-confidence miscalibration based on the gap 
in evaluation between the entrepreneur and a well-calibrate external expert. To calculate the 
subjective probability to achieve the goals we use a benchmarking model under risk (see [7]; [8]; 
[9]). 
 
Third, we present the main contribution of the paper. We identify situations in enterprise risk 
management (ERM) where misconfidence biases in judgments emerge. In the stream of research 
held by [7] and [10], we prove that overconfidence arise in connection with: (1) easy task agent’s 
perception coupled with expected extremely poor entrepreneurial performances, and (2) hard 
task agent’s perception coupled with expected extremely good entrepreneurial performances.  
 
In conclusion, we build a theoretical framework that: (1) sets a different definition for optimism 
and overconfidence biases; (2) provides foundation for overconfidence  conform with the 
prescriptive Expected Utility theory (see [11] and the descriptive Prospect Theory (see [12]; (3) 
spotlights  circumstances where self-confidence judgement is normatively biased. Our results 
have also practical implications. In fact, to make mindful evaluations entrepreneurs must be 
conscious when they are predisposed to fall in misconfidence traps. 
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the definitions of 
optimism and overconfidence. In Section 3 we set up a target-based theoretical model to 
calculate the probability to achieve the goal. Sufficient conditions for misconfidence in judgement 
are set out in Section 4. Section 5 sets up future research and concludes the paper. 
 
2. OPTIMISM AND OVERCONFIDENCE BIASES IN THE LANGUAGE OF 
 PROBABILITY 
Shepherd et al. [1] provide an extensive review of the several heuristics and biases documented 
in the entrepreneurial decision-making process. Among others, overconfidence and optimism are 
recognized key drivers in contributing  on either the firm development and success or the firm 
failure. Optimists are defined as people who tend “to hold positive expectancies for their future” 
(see [13]) and  look at the  goals through “rose-tinted glasses” (see the seminal studies of [14] 
and [15]). Vice versa, overconfident entrepreneurs are defined as individuals who overestimate 
the probability of successfully meeting their  commitments (see [16]). Despite a common believe, 
[17] has made evidence that  no association exists between optimism and overconfidence. To 
evaluate uncertain projects the entrepreneur has to fix  a goal to achieve. However, in real world 
the commitments are often vague and uncertain.  In other words, goals are random variables. It 
follows that the agent is asked to deliver her personal views in the language of probability. 
 
To explain this point, let start with a couple of examples. A manager  has to evaluate a project 
with an uncertain cash flow. The standard guide-lines in the corporate finance literature suggest 
to check the financial capital sustainability on the basis of strategic Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) (see [18]) as:  
 
1. Return on Equity (ROE);  
2. Return on Debt (ROD);  
3. Return on Investment (ROI).  
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Under the assumption of perfect capital market, the Modigliani-Miller formula (see [19]) relates 
the profitability indicator ROE of a project with the financial leverage ratios as follows: 
 
( )1ROE ROI SPREAD DER tax= + ⋅ ⋅ −    
Where 
SPREAD = ROI - ROD, 
DER =   Debt Equity Ratio = Debt
Equity
 
tax = average tax 
 
Specifically, Modigliani-Miller’s formula pinpoints the key role played by the quantity SPREAD = 
ROI - ROD . It does not only sign the profitability direction of ROE, but also emphasizes its value 
due to its multiplicative effect. A basic condition for financial sustainability of the project is given 
by:   
ROI > ROD. 
 
If the cash flows of the project are uncertain, ROI and ROD are uncertain as well. Therefore, 
above condition needs  to be translated in the language of probability. So, instead to check 
whether above inequality holds, we are asked to calculate:  
 
the probability that the (uncertain) ROI of the project be higher than the  (uncertain) ROD,  
 
and only if that value is sufficiently high the project will be taken under consideration. A further 
condition to keep under consideration before undertaking any entrepreneur project is that  
 
ROE > OCM 
 
where OCM is the opportunity cost of holding money, intended as the return of investing in a risk 
free security - like a treasury bill.  
 
In Section 3 we show an operational way to make the probability calculation. Need to define 
optimism first.   
 
2.1 Optimism: Look at Commitments Through “rose-tinted” Glasses 
Intuitively speaking an agent is optimist whether she tends to have a “pinked view” on the 
commitments. The problem of how an agent calibrates the subjective perception of the task 
difficulty has been investigated in the last twenty years in the experimental psychology literature 
see [15], [20] among others. The subjective judgments depend on: (1) the individual cardinal 
utility capturing risk preferences and (2) the personal “reference point” (see [12]). Then two 
practical questions arise:  
 
Q1.: How to elicit the individual cardinal utility/value function? 
Q2.: How to set the appropriate “reference point”? 
  
Let start to tackle Q1. Let u a bounded, increasing (but not constant) and continuous cardinal 
utility function. As seminally discussed by [21] in the context of ruin probabilities, without loss of 
generality, u can be normalized so that =inf ( ) 0u x  and =sup ( ) 1u x . Then u satisfies all the 
properties characterizing a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.).  As [22, p. 825] states “there 
are advantages to having the utility function represented by a distribution”, because we can grasp 
intuitive interpretations. In fact, if F denote  the c.d.f. of the uncertain target T, then  
 
 = ≥ =( ) ( ) ( )u x P X T F x                                                            (1) 
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See [22, p. 825]. Equation (1)  states a fundamental equivalence:  the c.d.f. F of the target T just 
coincides with the normalized utility function u. To put it differently, Equation (1) tells us that we 
can think of the agent cardinal utility ( )u x  as the probability that the uncertain target T is not 
greater than x. We conclude that all information about the agent optimism can be just 
extrapolated from the perceived shape of the c.d.f. of the target T.   
 
We are now ready to face Q2. In the last twenty years, this question is became a central one in 
the experimental and theoretical economics, see [23].  
 
We have to distinguish between the objective and subjective reference point:  
 
• The objective reference point: the median 
In experimental research the most common “reference point” is the median of the distribution of 
possible outcomes; see [24]. Let remind the definition. Given a random target T, the value m such 
that   
< <( ) 0.5P X m   and  ≥ ≥( ) 0.5P X m  
 
is called a median of T. The median thus defined always exists, and is unique. Alternative 
definitions are possible, but they yield the same value when the distribution of T is continuous and 
unimodal. Hereafter we consider only targets with unimodal distributions. 
 
• The subjective reference point: the mode 
Let assume the target T a unimodal2 random variable with mode M. As a consequence, the 
correspondent  c.d.f. ( )F x defined on the support ( , )a b , turns out to be an S-shaped c.d.f., that is 
convex for ( )∈ ,x a M    and concave for ( )∈ ,x M b . The concavity switching point is in 
correspondence of the mode M. To find out the agent perceived reference point we use formula 
(1). According to Prospect Theory (see [12]), the subjective reference point corresponds to the 
subjectively perceived “knock-out” value that divides the domain of the perceived losses from that 
of the perceived gains. By (1) the agent utility u coincides with the c.d.f. F, so u is  S-shaped with 
the concavity switching point in correspondence of M, as well. In conclusion, the agent reference 
point is just the mode M. 
 
As discussed in [7]  the definition of hard-perceived and easy-perceived task is given on basis of 
the gap between the target most likely value delivered by the agent, i.e. the mode M; and that 
delivered by an external expert, i.e. the median m. 
 
Intuitively, if the value M expressed by the agent is lower than that m,  then the agent feels the 
target easier than the external expert does; in such a case the agent is called an optimistic 
individual. Vice versa if M is higher than m, the agent is called a pessimistic individual. If M and m 
coincide then the agent is called a well-balanced in judgement individual (see Figure 1). 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Hard-perceived target, symmetric-perceived target and easy-perceived target. 
 
                                                 
2
 If T is not strictly unimodal, let M be the midpoint of the modal set. 
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A simple condition for testing the presence of optimism or pessimism is offered by the so-called 
van Zwet mean-median-mode inequalities; see [25]. Let a unimodal continuous target T with 
mean µ , median m and mode M.  Then: 
 
a) if the agent is pessimist, then µ ≤ ≤m M ; 
b) if the agent is optimist, then µ≤ ≤M m ; 
c) if the agent is well-balanced in judgement, then T is symmetric and µ = =m M . 
 
The alphabetical/counter-alphabetical order among mean, median and mode offers a user-
friendly test for optimism/pessimism measuring3 (see Figure 1).  
 
The intuition behind follows. Optimistic agents perceive the goal as an easy task, and set the 
subjective reference point, i.e. the mode M, smaller than the objective one, i.e. the median m; and 
vice versa pessimistic agents perceive the goal as a hard task and set the subjective reference 
point, i.e. the mode M, higher than the objective one, i.e. the median m. If the agents have 
symmetric-perceived opinions, the subjective and objective reference point coincides. 
 
Due to the equivalence (1) between the target c.d.f. and the agent utility function, [7, Theorem 2.] 
state the equivalence between the easy/hard target perception and loss aversion/gain seeking 
attitude. On the loss domain the utility function is convex that shows the agent gain seeking 
attitude, whereas on the gain domain the utility function is concave that exhibits the agent risk 
aversion (see Figure 2). 
 
 
FIGURE 2: A S-shaped utility/value function. 
 
Above is also related with the regulatory focus theory (see [24] and [27]). If individuals have a 
promotion focus, they exhibit risk-seeking attitude and are endowed with a convex utility function. 
Alternatively, if they have a prevention focus, they display risk-aversion and are endowed with a 
concave utility function. 
 
3. OVERCONFIDENCE: MISCALIBRATION OF THE SUCCESS 
 PROBABILITY 
Since the seminal studies of [14] and [28, page 5] confidence miscalibration has been 
documented and studied in social sciences. [29] distinguish three different facets of confidence 
miscalibration: (a) the misconfidence, i.e. a fallacious confidence in own performance; (b) the 
overplacement or ‘better-than-average’ effect, i.e. the misconfidence in own performance relative 
to others; and (3) the overprecision, i.e.  the tendency to have excessive trust in forecasting  
                                                 
3
 Note that van Zwet inequalities are only necessary conditions for optimism and pessimism, see 
[26] for counterexamples and [7] for technical details. 
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future uncertainty. In the following, we focus on (1) the self-misconfidence. We say that an agent 
gives a “misaligned judgement” when her personal evaluation of the probability of success is 
misaligned respect to that expressed by the external expert. A crucial point turns out:  
 
How to measure the probability of meeting the target? 
 
To achieve this objective, we draw upon the benchmarking procedure. 
 
The benchmarking procedure originally proposed by [8] indicates an operational way to calculate 
the probability that an (uncertain) project X overcomes the (uncertain) target T. This prescriptive 
target-based model satisfies [11]’s and [30]’s axiomatization through a probabilistic and intuitive 
interpretation of the expected utility of a lottery X. [31] prove that the expected utility of a lottery X 
can be read as the probability that X outperforms a stochastically independent target T with c.d.f. 
u, i.e. 
  ≥ =( ) ( )P X T Eu X                                    (2) 
 
where (.)E  is the expectation operator. This interpretation shows the key advantage in using the 
benchmark-procedure: the subjective beliefs about the probability of successfully meeting the 
target coincide with the expected utility of X. In conclusion all we need to calculate (2): (a) the 
perceived c.d.f. of the uncertain target index T (corresponding to ROD in the example in Sec. 2); 
and (b) the c.d.f. of the uncertain financial index X of the project (corresponding to ROI in the 
example in Sec. 2). 
 
4. WHEN DOES MISCONFIDENCE OCCUR? 
Using [7, Theorem 3.] sufficient conditions for misconfidence biases can be stated. For 
explanatory purposes, we word them in the frame of the example described in Sec. 2. 
 
Let ROD  an uncertain target with median m.  Suppose that an external expert declares equal to 
m the most likely value for ROD.  Let ROI is the financial index chosen to measure the financial 
attractiveness of the uncertain project at hand. Let ROI  is independent of ROD. Then if the agent 
perceives that: 
 
a) the most likely value for ROD is smaller than m (i.e. she faces an easy-perceived target) and 
the support of ROI belongs to ( ]−∞,m , i.e. the expectancies on the financial project outcomes are 
very bad, or 
b)  the most likely value for ROD is greater than m (i.e. she faces a hard-perceived target) and 
the support of ROI belongs to [ )+∞,m , i.e. the expectancies on the financial project outcomes are 
very good,  
 
then the agent  exhibits overconfidence on the probability that ROI >ROD. And vice versa, if the 
agent perceives that: 
 
c) ROD  is greater than m (i.e. she faces a hard-perceived target) and the support of ROI 
belongs to ( ]−∞,m , i.e. the expectancies on the financial project outcomes are very bad, or 
d) ROD is smaller than m (i.e. she faces an easy-perceived target) and the support of ROI 
belongs to [ )+∞,m , i.e. the expectancies on the financial project outcomes are very good,  
 
then the agent  exhibits underconfidence on the probability that ROI >ROD.  
 
Clearly, above results on misconfidence in succeeding targets can be extended to other 
statements involving different strategic KPIs, as for example, that the probability that ROE be 
superior to the opportunity cost of holding money.  
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Immediate evidences turn out. The optimism attitude and the overconfidence bias are distinct 
constructs. That is consistent with [6] and [17] empirical studies, where the association sign 
between these two biases is not clear. The very gears in moving towards over/under confidence 
are: (1) the expected performances of the uncertain project measured by ROI as in the example 
in Sec. 2; (2) the attitude of believing in having to face an easy/hard task. In experimental 
psychology, conditions a) to d) are related to cognitive biases as follows: 
 
a) Overconfidence in handling with very-poor projects is commonly associated with the 
“escalation of commitment effect” (see the seminal studies of [33]). That is also referred to the 
“sunk cost fallacy” that is the misleading behavior that guides managers to invest resources into 
failing businesses. This bias is also set in relation with the "hot-hand fallacy" (also known as the 
"hot hand phenomenon" or "hot hand"). That is the false belief that an entrepreneur who has once 
experienced success has a greater chance of further success in the future, although the project at 
hand displays realistic poor expectancies. These circumstances correspond to case a). 
 
b) Dealing with hard-perceived tasks coupled with very good expectancies on the outcomes 
(see case b)) may drive ambitious managers to be overconfident. That is commonly explained as 
an effect of the “desirability bias” that influences the evaluation of desired event occurrence (see 
e.g. [34]). 
 
c) When pessimism in evaluating the target difficulty is associated to poor expectancies on the 
project outcomes, a loss adverse entrepreneur tends to be underconfident in successfully 
meeting the target (see case c)). That tendency may be explained by the influence of “pessimism 
bias” that induces the “status quo effect”. That is related also with the loss and gain asymmetry in 
judgment according to the statement that “losses loom much than gains” see [12, page 279]. 
Another possible motivation can be blamed to the “de-escalation effect” that typically occurs when 
the task is perceived extremely difficult (see [34]). 
 
d) Underconfidence detected in case d) can be explained by the “de-escalation effect”, as 
documented by [35]. An easy-perceived task may reduce the “goal attainment” and consequently 
cause disaffection in achieving the goal. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper is a part of the growing literature on the impact of behavioral biases on entrepreneurial 
decision-making process (see [1]). Specifically, we focus on the optimism and overconfidence 
biases. We contribute to the literature in various ways.  
 
First, we introduce a formal definition for optimism, as the tendency to underestimate the difficulty 
of the task to achieve, and then we define overconfidence, as the tendency to overestimate the 
probability of meeting the commitments. Second, we identify a practical method to calculate the 
subjective probability to achieve a given task. Third, we identify circumstances where 
inconsistencies in self-confidence arise.  
 
Our results have also practical implications. In fact, being conscious of being normatively 
influenced by cognitive biases is essential to take mindful decisions. However, on the path of [17]  
further empirical studies direct to measure the matching between theoretical findings and real-life 
evidences are needed and are left to future agenda. 
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